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BOOK REVIEW
Defending the Environment: A Strategy
for Citizen Action
By
JOSEPH L. SAX
New York: Alfred A. Knopft. 1971.
Pp. xix, 252, $6.95.
Professor Joseph L. Sax, generally acknowledged as the nation's
foremost expert on environmental law, 1 has written a direct,
straight-forward, hard-hitting, and entertaining book about environmental litigation. Less scholarly and less closely reasoned and documented than his truly outstanding work on Water Law, Planningand
Policy,2 the present volume is clearly intended for a more general
readership of laymen as well as lawyers; it is, however, an exceptionally well-written and sprightly work. The author has chosen a
few deserving targets, and has loosed quite an impressive barrage,
scoring quite a few hits. His well-researched accounts of official indifference or misjudgment, as well as his blow-by-blow descriptions
of some of the most important recent environmental litigations
captivated this reader like a well-done "who-done-it"-in spite of the
fact that, like other environmentally informed readers, he already
knew. In a number of instances, Professor Sax has relied not only on
official publications and records to make his point, but has implemented generally available sources by recourse to interviews with
some of the principal actors in the decision-making process.
It is the author's major thesis that administrative agencies-more
particularly agencies concerned with the protection of environmental, natural or scenic resources-fail to act in the public interest,
in part because they have been coopted by the interests or industries
they are supposed to regulate, and in part, because the agency
process is too highly politicized and too involved with purely selfprotective institutional concerns. In consequence, decisions are being
made which result in irreversibly squandering scenic and environmental resources, an irreversible damage to the biosphere, and in
limiting our choices for the future. Since administrative agencies
were initally created to protect the public interest, and since, in
Professor Sax's view, they have failed to do so, he finds a need for a
1. See Sax, Defending the Environment: A Strategy for Citizen Action, front flap

(1971).
2. Sax, Water Law, Planning and Policy (1968).
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more direct assertion of the public interest. In his view, the public
interest is most effectively vindicated in lawsuits brought by so-called
public interest groups-i.e., groups or organizations of private persons
joined together for the express purpose of protecting the public
interest-as they see it.
Professor Sax argues persuasively that such "public interest" plaintiffs should be given recognition as proper parties to bring, or to
intervene in, lawsuits to protect the people's interest in a clean and
protected environment. Since such plaintiffs have all but won the
"standing to sue" issue, 3 his work in this instance covers familiar
procedural ground. Once a public interest plaintiff has secured his
right to get into the litigation, he will face the inevitable question of
the precise nature of the substantive rights to vindicate. In some
instances, there is express statutory law providing the substantive
grounds, though sometimes these grounds may have little to do with
environmental protection-as in the instance, properly criticized by
the author, when a substantive conservation issue was decided in
favor of the public interest plaintiff because the particular dredgeand-fill operation, preparatory to the construction of a highway that
adversely affected the ecology of the Hudson River, was halted because it involved the construction of a "dike" that, under applicable
law, required Congressional approval.4 Good litigator that he is, Professor Sax dislikes the right decision for the wrong reason as much as
does this reviewer. In the absence of available statutory grounds for
environmental protection, the author urges the further advancement
and development of the "public trust" theory, an interesting relic of
Roman law, which he had previously exhumed in a well-supported
and scholarly article.' Perhaps the courts will seize upon this doctrine as a useful and flexible instrument for environmental protection. If they do, the credit will be entirely Professor Sax's, who has
done everything possible to pour new wine into that aged receptacle.
But the potential flexibility of the doctrine is a function of its
vagueness. It relies on the irrefutable assertion that public property,
particularly public lands, are to be used only for the public good. But
the mere fact that the trust concept is used does not aid in defining
what public good. In modem times, as the author points out, the
doctrine has been used in only a few cases to undo particularly
flagrant giveaways of public resources by turn-of-the-century state
3. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp 238 (M.D. Pa.
1970); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
4. Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970).
5. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 471

(1970).
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legislatures. 6 Other expressions of the doctrine may be found in
holdings of the courts in Massachusetts, which follow the sensible
doctrine that public property which is already being used for a particular purpose pursuant to state legislation cannot be turned to
another public purpose without clear legislative authorization-i.e., a
piece of land used as a public park cannot be used for a public
housing project unless there is a clear legislative pronouncement preferring the latter purpose.7 There have also been some "public trust"
allusions in a recent Supreme Court decision that construed provisions of the Federal Highway Act that parkland could not be taken
for highway purposes if there is a "feasible and prudent alternative."' On the whole, these are slim pickings. Unlike some of his
more enthusiastic public trust disciples, 9 Sax does not claim that
private owners hold land under a public trust, but even without this
further extension, the public trust doctrine leaves much to be desired
as a solid foundation for environmental law making. What are the
terms of the trust? Who is "the public," the beneficiary for whom
the trust is held? Who determines "the public good," i.e., the purposes of the trust? Are all of these questions to be answered ad hoc
by the courts, as specific issues are presented to them?
Professor Sax is not naive and it is evident that he is well aware of
the problem. It is apparent that, given the choice, he, too, would
prefer to rely on specific legislative directions rather than on the
public trust doctrine. But as a public interest plaintiff in search of a
substantive cause of action, he occasionally overstates his case. It is
true that too many agencies have been coopted by the interests they
ought to regulate. It is true also, as the author amply demonstrates,
that there is too much political carrying-of-water-on-both-shoulders.
But there is no assurance that reliance on litigation and on the unguided policy judgment of the courts will fairly resolve all environmental issues that involve a determination of the public interest. In
Sax's book, the "public interest" is referred to frequently and
feelingly, but it remains undefined. The author seems to regard "the
public interest" as a given, as something that, in the old Victorian
phrase, will be agreed upon by all right-minded and virtuous men.
But is it really that simple? Do conservation organizations and en6. E.g., Illinois Cen. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land
and Imp. Co., 93 Wis. 534, 67 N.W. 918 (1896); Kimball v. MacPherson, 46 Cal. 104

(1873).
7. Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966).

8. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
9. Berlin, Roisman & Kessler, Law in Action: The Trust Doctrine, in Law and the
Environment 166, 174 et seq. (Baldwin ed. 1970).
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vironmental defense groups necessarily represent "the" public
interest? In any given situation, is "the" public interest that of the
trout fisherman or that of the employees in a local paper mill whose
plant finds it difficult to meet effluent standards? Perhaps administrative agencies, properly instructed by the legislature, properly constituted, non-coopted, and properly subject to judicial review, are as
capable guardians in the first instance of the public interest as the
courts-and perhaps even better because of their continuing involvement in, and responsibility for the subject matter and their greater
expertise, if not in the making of general public policy judgments,
then in the particular technical or scientific area regulated.
In the author's view, courts are better suited to dispute resolution
than administrative agencies. Courts are said to have the following
advantages: they are outsiders to the dispute. Their membership is
selected with non-environmental considerations in mind. Thus, they
need not balance the interests of constituencies, as the author
contends is the case with administrative agencies. And they provide
an opportunity for citizen initiative through litigation-which is provided for only to a lesser extent by administrative agencies.
Peculiarly, Sax even views the courts' technical "lack of expertise" as
an advantage." The point has been made that although administrative agencies may be expert in their respective technical areas,
they are not necessarily expert in making public policy judgments.
Thus, a highway commission is expert in determining that one route
will cost $20 million less than another, but it is not expert in determining whether the scenic preservation resulting from the more expensive route is worth it.'' But this does not quite support the
notion that the courts' lack of technical expertise is an advantage!
In emphasizing litigation as a major weapon in the defense of the
environment, the author makes a number of valid points. The use of
the preliminary injunction, for instance, has indubitably had outstanding success in delaying, and ultimately preventing a number of
major and irreversible insults to the environment, such as, for instance, in the case of the Alaska pipeline.'2 He is right, too, in
denying the old saw that the judicial process is necessarily replete
with delay and procrastination. In those instances where injunctive
processes are appropriate, and where the matter may be dealt with
by a preliminary injunction, judicial processes are demonstrably
prompt and decisive-though they may work, sometimes, to delay
10. Sax, supra note 1, at 107-10.
11. Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 612 (1970).
12. Wilderness Society v. Hickel, 325 F.Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970).

January 19721

BOOK REVIEWS

needed public works for a long time. He is clearly right in asserting
that the courts' hands need to be strengthened to deal promptly with
official actions that, unguided and unchecked, may cause irreversible
damage. On the other hand, the need for effective judicial devices to
check administrative action before its consequences become irreversible does not in and of itself argue for the downgrading of administrative agencies that Sax implies. He would, for instance, give
the courts a far greater scope of administrative review than they
presently have. This is articulated, too, in the Michigan Environmental Protection Bill1 3 which he has authored, and which has been
used as "model" legislation in many states. Indeed, the HartMcGovern bill presently pending in Congress 4 springs from the
same source. In Sax's view, the usual formulation of judicial reviewthat administrative judgments will not be set aside unless they are
"arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law"-is far too narrow to
allow the courts to exercise a full range of public policy judgments.
Under the Michigan law, for instance, when a public interest plaintiff
brings an action against a paper mill for excessive emissions of
sulphur dioxide, evidence on behalf of the defendant that the paper
mill complies with administratively set standards would not protect
him against a finding by the court that his activities cast an undue
burden on the environment." s It is submitted that this would deny
administrative agencies a primary role even in the areas of their
special, technical competence. This would indeed result in the court
substituting its judgment for that of the agency in the very technical
fields where, by legislative definition, the agency judgment is better
qualified. It would undo the entire field of administrative law. When
courts are free to substitute their judgment for the technical judgments of administrative agencies, then we shall witness a return to
the long-dead notions of substantive due process, when courts undid
legislative and administrative standards simply because they did not
agree with their underlying political philosophy. It is perhaps worth
mentioning, as a curious historical footnote, that it was dissatisfaction with judicial meddling under such substantive due process
notions that gave major impetus to the development of adminis13. Environmental Protection Act of 1970, Pub. Act. No. 127, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.

(1970).
14. S. 1032, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1971).
15. Environmental Protection Act of 1970, Pub. Act. No. 127, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.
§ 5(2) (1970), states: ".... any alleged pollution, impairment or destruction of the air,
water or other natural resources or the public trust therein, shall be determined, and no
conduct shall be authorized or approved which does, or is likely to have such effect so long
as there is a feasible and prudent alternative consistent with the reasonable requirements of
the public, health, safety and welfare."
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trative agencies in the 1930's! Such a broad delegation of power to
courts is more than a mere invitation to make some environmental
common law-it may well be an unconstitutional delegation. 1 6 It
may be void first on due process grounds because it is a delegation
without ascertainable standards, and second, because it may violate
state constitutional separation of power requirements.
It might be added that the "administrative-review syndrome of
crabbed inquiries" which the author postulates' ' is a fiction rather
than a fact. The "arbitrary, capricious and contrary to law" formulation, administrative lawyers agree, has never stood in the way of
judicial reversal of clearly erroneous and wrongful administrative
decisions.
In the author's view, litigation operates as a catalyst to legislative
action in pointing up existing needs. This is probably the area in
which environmental litigation has done its best service. Sax, however, views the litigation process also as a device to "make democracy
work." He would employ litigation to serve as a "technique of legislative remand."' 8 In this view, litigation would serve to stop administrative action having environmental impact whenever the legislative intent was unclear, thereby compelling the proponent of such
action to return to the legislature for specific authorization-if he can
get it. It is an interesting notion, which overlooks some of the established relationships between legislative and administrative action. In
many instances, the legislative intent in creating a program is clearto provide general policy guidelines to an administrative agency and
to let the administrative agency determine particular guidelines
which may be in disagreement with the specific determination of a
properly delegated agency?
Sax is right in asserting that litigation can provide a necessary
moratorium on hasty action, an opportunity to stand still and review
the environmental impact, particularly administrative decisions. Such
a moratorium may be useful, but there ought to be self-restraint in
calling for it. The moratorium can turn into a dead end for a needed
project. Thus, there are many recent instances when "moratoria"
caused by litigation relating to power plant siting may ultimately
cause harmful delays." 9 There would seem to be a real risk that such
16. A lower Michigan court has so held. Roberts v. Michigan, No. 12428-C (Cir. Ct.,
Ingham County, Mich., May 4, 1971).
17. Sax, supra note 1 at 148.

18. Id. at 192.
19. A recent decision requiring a revision of the Atomic Energy Commission's procedures
has delayed indefinitely the construction of 112 atomic facilities, many of which had
already been licensed. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, No. 24,839
(D.C. Cir., July 23, 1971); N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1971, at 23.
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prolonged moratoria may result in an anti-environmental protection
backlash which will serve nobody's interest.
One aspect of environmental protection receives hardly any mention in the book at all, and that is the continuing surveillance and
control of pollution, which is primarily an urban problem. Litigation
has worked best in checking the environmental impact of specific
newly proposed projects, be they roads, power plants, dikes, or
canals. Litigation-and particularly the preliminary injunction-can
stop the bulldozer or the construction crew and can put off a project
until proper measures to protect the environment have been taken.
Public interest litigation thus far has not been used successfully to
protect against the continuing emission of air pollutants and the
continuing discharge of effluents from industrial production. That
happens to be an area in which a one-shot preliminary injunction will
not serve. It happens to be an area where continuous standardsetting, continuous surveillance, and continuous enforcement are
needed to accomplish the purpose. In brief, it is an area for the
continuous efforts of administrative agencies, well staffed, well
equipped, and with adequate legal enforcement powers. It is an area
of at least as great importance as conservation, recreation, and scenic
preservation. Administrative agencies must not be denigrated in importance, because, whatever their faults-and they are many and
need to be corrected-they are needed to do the one major continuing job that private interest litigation is least equipped to accomplish.
The protection of the environment is a major and continuing function of government. It is public business. Environmental litigation by
private "public interest" plaintiffs can help call attention to that
important phase of public business, but it should not be made to
appear as a substitute for it.
Instead of placing major reliance on private citizen action, important though it may be, we must gear our governmental machinery to
accept responsibility for and the full costs of long-range environmental management, just as we do in the case of other major social
problems. Just as social welfare is likely to remain a continuing problem of our society, so will environmental protection. In each instance, citizen action in the courts can call attention to the needs.
The fulfillment of the needs remains a government function, best
carried out in the only way we know-through the legislature-and
through properly constituted and properly equipped administrative
agencies.
FRANK P. GRADt
tProfessor of Law; Director, Legislative Drafting Research Fund, Columbia Law School.

